The killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in coordinated United States and Israeli airstrikes on Saturday, has triggered the most consequential leadership rupture inside the Islamic Republic since the death of the country’s founding figure nearly four decades ago.
The strike did not only remove the supreme leader at the apex of Iran’s hierarchy; it also eliminated multiple senior commanders at the heart of the country’s security apparatus.
Iran’s system of governance is structured around the office of the supreme leader, which stands above the presidency, parliament and judiciary. With Khamenei’s death, the country has entered an interim phase provided for under its constitution.
Iran’s constitution lays out a specific contingency for the death of a sitting supreme leader.
Article 111 authorises the formation of a temporary leadership council to assume the powers and responsibilities of the supreme leader until a successor is formally selected. In this case, that arrangement came into effect on Sunday.
The three-person interim body consists of President Masoud Pezeshkian, judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei
and senior cleric Alireza Arafi.
Each represents a different pillar of the Islamic Republic’s power structure: the elected executive branch, the judicial system and the clerical establishment that underpins the regime’s ideological authority.
Together, they are constitutionally mandated to oversee state affairs until a new supreme leader is appointed.
Iran’s parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf framed the move as evidence that the state had prepared for such contingencies. “With the formation of a leadership council, an unimaginable power and cohesion will take shape,” he said.
He added that the political system had “prepared ourselves for these moments” and “planned for all scenarios.”
Despite these assurances, the interim council is operating in conditions that differ sharply from previous leadership transitions in Iran. When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died in 1989, the political system moved quickly to install Khamenei as his successor within less than a day.
In contrast, the current process is unfolding amid continuing US-Israeli strikes, which complicates deliberations and disrupts the ability of senior figures to meet and coordinate freely.
As a result, there is no publicly stated timeline for how long the interim council will remain in place.
What do we know about these three figures?
Alireza Arafi
Alireza Arafi occupies a central position within Iran’s clerical and oversight institutions. He has been a member of the Guardian Council since 2019, a body whose members are appointed by the supreme leader and which wields significant influence over Iran’s political system by vetting legislation and election candidates to ensure conformity with Islamic principles.
The Guardian Council has the power to reject laws passed by parliament and disqualify candidates from running for office, including in presidential and parliamentary elections.
Arafi also serves as deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts, the body formally responsible for selecting the supreme leader.
Beyond these roles, he leads Friday prayers in Qom, Iran’s most important religious centre, and heads the country’s seminary system, overseeing the education and training of religious leaders nationwide.
Masoud Pezeshkian
Masoud Pezeshkian, 71, represents the elected executive branch. A heart surgeon by training, he served in the army during the Iran-Iraq War and later entered politics.
He held the post of health minister under President Mohammad Khatami and subsequently served as a member of parliament representing the northwestern city of Tabriz after 2005.
After unsuccessful presidential bids in earlier years, Pezeshkian won the 2024 election on a reform-oriented platform.
His campaign focused on economic stabilisation, easing of social restrictions and constructive engagement abroad, while maintaining loyalty to the constitutional framework of the Islamic Republic.
Following Khamenei’s assassination, Pezeshkian issued a statement declaring that Iran now considers “it its legitimate duty and right to avenge the perpetrators and masterminds of this historic crime.”
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, the third member of the interim council, represents the hard-line wing of Iran’s political establishment.
Appointed as head of the judiciary by Khamenei in July 2021, he has previously served as intelligence minister from 2005 to 2009, as well as prosecutor-general and first deputy chief justice.
He is widely regarded as closely aligned with conservative factions within the government. In January, when the collapse of the rial sparked protests across Iran, Mohseni-Ejei pledged “no leniency” towards what he described as “rioters.”
He has also accused the United States and Israel of openly supporting unrest inside Iran following Trump’s earlier calls for Iranians to take to the streets.
Ali Larijani
Although not formally part of the interim trio, Ali Larijani remains a significant figure in the transition. As head of the Supreme National Security Council, he is widely viewed as a central power broker with deep roots in Iran’s institutions.
Born in Najaf in 1957 into a clerical family close to Khomeini, Larijani has held senior positions across multiple branches of the state and is believed to have enjoyed Khamenei’s confidence for many years.
In the immediate aftermath of the assassination, he outlined transition plans and pledged forceful retaliation against the United States and Israel, signalling continuity in Iran’s security posture.
Who formally chooses Iran’s next supreme leader?
Under Iran’s political system, the formal authority to select the next supreme leader lies with the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member body composed of senior clerics.
Members of the Assembly are elected by the public every eight years, but the field of candidates is vetted by the Guardian Council, which screens nominees for ideological and religious suitability.
The Guardian Council’s influence extends beyond the Assembly of Experts. In normal circumstances, it reviews legislation passed by parliament to determine whether it conforms to Islamic law, frequently demanding changes before bills can become law.
It also approves candidates for parliamentary and presidential elections. The body has a record of disqualifying large numbers of candidates, including prominent political figures.
Ahead of the 2021 presidential election, for example, the Guardian Council barred more than 600 applicants, including all women who had registered and senior figures such as Ali Larijani, reported CNN.
Although the Assembly of Experts holds the formal mandate to select the supreme leader, decision-making power in practice is shaped by the balance of forces within Iran’s political and security elite.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which answers directly to the supreme leader and has evolved into one of the most powerful institutions in the country, is widely seen as holding decisive weight in shaping the outcome of leadership transitions.
Who is being discussed as potential successors?
Mojtaba Khamenei
Mojtaba Khamenei, the second son of the late supreme leader, is regarded as a significant behind-the-scenes figure with strong links to the IRGC and the Basij, a volunteer paramilitary force.
His proximity to key security institutions has fuelled speculation about his potential influence in the succession process.
At the same time, Iran’s political system emerged from a revolution that overthrew a monarchy, and parts of the Shiite clerical establishment may be reluctant to endorse a father-to-son transfer of supreme authority.
Alireza Arafi
Alireza Arafi, already serving on the interim leadership council, is also seen as a prominent contender. His institutional reach is unusually broad: he is deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts, a member of the Guardian Council and head of Iran’s seminary system.
These roles places him at the bodies responsible for vetting candidates and selecting the supreme leader. He was appointed to several senior positions by Khamenei, giving him continuity credentials within the existing power structure.
Mohammad Mehdi Mirbagheri
Mohammad Mehdi Mirbagheri, a member of the Assembly of Experts associated with the most conservative wing of the clerical establishment, is another name mentioned in discussions about succession.
Hassan Khomeini
Hassan Khomeini, a grandson of Ruhollah Khomeini, is also seen as a possible candidate and is known to be less hard-line than many of his peers within the clerical elite.
Beyond these individuals, there is also the possibility that Iran’s leadership opts for a figure who is younger and less well known to the public, or that it experiments with a collective leadership arrangement rather than concentrating power in a single individual.
Such options would still fall within the constitutional framework, which allows flexibility in how the supreme leadership role is structured.
What about the IRGC?
The strikes that killed Khamenei also inflicted severe losses on Iran’s senior military leadership. Israel has claimed that
a majority of Iran’s top commanders were killed in the February 28 attacks.
Iran has confirmed the deaths of several high-ranking figures, including armed forces chief of staff Abdolrahim Mousavi, IRGC commander-in-chief Mohammad Pakpour, defence minister Aziz Nasirzadeh and Ali Shamkhani, who was serving as a senior adviser to the supreme leader and secretary of the Defence Council.
On Sunday, state media announced that Ahmad Vahidi had been appointed as the new commander of the IRGC.
Vahidi is a former defence and interior minister and is under US sanctions for his role in Iran’s suppression of protests, including the use of lethal force by security services during the nationwide demonstrations in 2022.
His appointment signals continuity in the IRGC’s hard-line posture and reflects the regime’s priority of rapidly filling leadership gaps
within its most powerful military institution.
How is real power being exercised inside Iran?
With multiple senior leaders killed and the supreme leadership vacant, day-to-day authority in Iran is expected to be exercised through interim structures and informal power networks.
The IRGC, in particular,
is positioned to play a decisive role behind the scenes.
Answerable only to the supreme leader, the Guards are tasked with confronting external threats and maintaining internal order. Over decades, they have expanded their influence beyond purely military functions to become deeply embedded in Iran’s political economy.
Many of Iran’s economic elites, who gained access to state resources and contracts during years of international sanctions, hold influential positions within or closely linked to the IRGC.
This has given the Guards leverage over key sectors of the economy as well as over political decision-making.
The IRGC oversees the Basij, a volunteer paramilitary force that operates as a visible presence on Iran’s streets. The Basij functions as a domestic enforcement arm, tasked with maintaining order and enforcing Islamic norms.
Drawing recruits from across the country, often from poorer and more conservative backgrounds, the Basij plays a role in propping up the regime during periods of unrest.
Although many senior IRGC leaders are believed to have been killed in the recent strikes, the organisational structure of the Guards and their control over the Basij remain intact, providing the regime with a mechanism to project authority internally during the transition period.
The IRGC fields between 150,000 and 190,000 personnel across its army, navy, air force and intelligence branches, making it a parallel military structure with substantial autonomy and reach.
Can there be a regime change in Iran?
United States President Donald Trump urged Iranians to overthrow their government following the strikes. “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be, probably, your only chance for generations,” he said in a video posted on Truth Social.
He also called on the IRGC to lay down its weapons or “face certain death.” In an interview with CBS News, Trump said that
there were “some good candidates” to take power, without naming any individuals.
Within Iran, these statements have been used by hard-line figures to reinforce claims that unrest is being encouraged from abroad. Mohseni-Ejei accused the United States and Israel of openly supporting domestic unrest after Trump called on Iranians to take to the streets.
Despite isolated scenes of celebration reported after Khamenei’s death, there has been little evidence of a broad-based uprising or of defections among Iran’s security elites.
The absence of large-scale street mobilisation or visible fractures within the IRGC suggests that, at least in the immediate aftermath, the regime’s coercive and organisational capacity remains intact.
Outside the country, Reza Pahlavi
has been mentioned by some commentators as a potential alternative leader. The eldest son of Iran’s deposed shah, he was 16 when the 1979 revolution overthrew his father and has since lived in the United States.
Some have suggested that he would enjoy backing from Israel.
However, he holds no formal position within Iran’s political system, and his role remains that of an external figure rather than an institutional actor in the succession process.
With inputs from agencies
