For weeks, Washington has been consumed by talk of a proposed “Core 5” (C5) framework involving the United States, China, Russia, India and Japan.
The idea surfaced through detailed reports by US defence outlet Defense One and Politico, both of which said the concept appeared in a longer, not publicly released version of the National Security Strategy (NSS) unveiled by the Trump administration last week.
While the White House insists no such classified document exists, the suggestion that the US may be considering replacing legacy multilateral platforms, particularly the G7, with a new, exclusive forum of major powers — one that deliberately leaves Europe out — is not being taken lightly.
India’s presence in this theoretical grouping has raised questions about how New Delhi might fit into a strategic club that also includes Beijing and Moscow.
What is the ‘Core 5’?
The proposed C5 is described as a potential high-level platform bringing together five of the world’s most influential states: the United States, China, India, Japan and Russia.
All five countries are not only major players in global politics, but also among the world’s most populous nations, each exceeding 100 million people (a total population of about 3.5 billion).
Defense One reported that the idea appeared in a longer, unpublished version of the Trump administration’s NSS. The concept, as described, would establish regular meetings among the five governments, with summits built around thematic issues.
One of the areas reportedly identified in the draft strategy was security developments in the West Asia, particularly the possibility of pushing forward diplomatic efforts between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
This C5 construct is portrayed as an alternative to the G7, which includes the US, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, the UK and Italy, with the EU participating institutionally.
Trump has publicly expressed discomfort with the G7 in the past, even suggesting that other global powers could be brought into the grouping. Discussions about Russia or China joining an expanded G7, for example, have surfaced several times during his presidency.
What does the reported NSS draft contain?
According to Defense One’s account, the extended NSS presents a starkly different worldview from previous US strategic documents. Notably, it argues that the goal of maintaining American dominance across the world was unrealistic and misguided.
The leaked text is said to state, “After the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country. Yet the affairs of other countries are our concern only if their activities directly threaten our interests.”
The reported draft also states that the United States should reconsider the scope of its global commitments, concentrating instead on issues that directly affect American interests and prioritising its own hemisphere.
This reasoning is reflected in a broader reorientation toward Latin America and the Caribbean, an area where the US has recently increased military and political involvement.
The same document, as summarised by Defense One, reportedly says, “We will reward and encourage the region’s governments, political parties, and movements broadly aligned with our principles and strategy,” while also acknowledging that the US can collaborate with governments “with different outlooks with whom we nonetheless share interests and who want to work with us.”
Another claim is that the draft frames Europe as facing “civilisational erasure” due to immigration and societal changes, suggesting that traditional US allies on the continent may not remain central pillars of American strategy.
Instead, the unpublished version allegedly advocates for deeper engagement with four EU member states often at odds with Brussels — Austria, Hungary, Italy and Poland — describing them as nations with a tradition of dissent within the European Union.
The EU angle: Favouring exit over unity?
A striking element attributed to the draft NSS is its endorsement of a strategy encouraging certain European countries to distance themselves from the EU.
Defense One reported that the document identified Austria, Hungary, Italy and Poland as potential candidates for separation from the bloc, following the example set by Brexit.
The proposal is portrayed as part of a larger effort to
“Make Europe Great Again,” a phrase that echoes Trump’s broader rhetorical style.
The reported version also encourages Washington to amplify political groups and cultural voices in Europe that advocate sovereignty, national identity and a return to traditional social frameworks.
It reportedly says that the US should “support parties, movements, and intellectual and cultural figures who seek sovereignty and preservation/restoration of traditional European ways of life … while remaining pro-American.”
There is no official acknowledgment that this document exists, and the White House has firmly rejected claims of any classified or alternate version of the NSS.
Why has the C5 idea gained traction in Washington?
Despite denials, the idea of a C5 has resonated with several analysts who have experience with Trump’s foreign-policy approach. Multiple former officials say the proposal is not entirely inconsistent with Trump’s known diplomatic instincts.
Politico reported that some of Trump’s early decisions and delegations reinforce the impression that he is comfortable engaging directly with rival powers.
For example, he
authorised the sale of Nvidia’s H200 chips to China — a move that suggests openness to high-level technological transactions with Beijing even during a period of strategic competition.
Similarly, Trump sent
businessman Steve Witkoff and former White House adviser Jared Kushner to Moscow for direct discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Such actions highlight Trump’s preference for personal deal-making and unconventional diplomatic channels.
A senior official from Trump’s first administration told Politico that while a C5 or C7 was never explicitly discussed, the concept did not seem implausible.
The official said, “Nothing around a C5 or C7 was discussed, but there were certainly conversations that the existing bodies like the G-structures or the UN Security Council weren’t fit for purpose given today’s new players.”
Does the C5 reflect Trump’s worldview?
Torrey Taussig, formerly the director for European affairs on the National Security Council under US President Joe Biden, told Politico, “This aligns with how we know President Trump to view the world, which is nonideologically, through an affinity for strongmen, and through a propensity of working with other great powers that maintain spheres of influence in their region.”
Her assessment also highlights the absence of Europe from the proposed grouping. Taussig said this may lead European countries to conclude that the US sees Russia as the dominant force on the continent.
Such an implication would represent a dramatic shift from decades of US policy that viewed European unity as a cornerstone of American strategic interests.
Other experts point to a sharp break from Trump’s own earlier stance on China.
Michael Sobolik, who worked for US Senator Ted Cruz during the Trump’s first term, said the C5 would undercut the great-power rivalry framework that had previously shaped US-China relations.
He said, “The first Trump administration bought into the framework of a great power competition and that was how we couched and talked about the relationship with China. This is just a huge departure.”
The C5 idea also coincides with remarks from US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, who recently
described a Trump-Xi meeting as a historic “G2”, drawing criticism from lawmakers who worried this language signals a softer stance toward Beijing.
US Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi wrote to Hegseth expressing concern, arguing, “Your description of the US relationship with the CCP as a ‘G2’ is deeply troubling and suggests a fundamental misreading of the United States’ foremost global adversary that risks dangerously undermining the Pentagon’s preparations for deterring conflict in the Indo-Pacific.”
Why does India matter in this theoretical C5?
The inclusion of India in the suggested C5 structure is one of the most consequential aspects for South Asia. India is not only a rising global economic and political power but also a state with a growing role in Indo-Pacific strategic calculations.
The idea of India joining a platform alongside the US, China, Japan and Russia displays a recognition of its importance in 21st-century geopolitics.
India’s participation makes sense for several reasons given its population and economic weight. India’s demographic scale and its expanding economic influence position it as a long-term anchor in any global leadership configuration.
India also sits at the intersection of major maritime and continental tensions, connecting the Indo-Pacific with West Asia and Central Asia.
And, unlike treaty allies such as Japan, India is not formally tied to any bloc. This gives it latitude to engage multiple powers simultaneously — an attribute that would be central to a hypothetical C5.
However, India’s presence in a grouping that also features China and the US would bring its own challenges, particularly given its border tensions with Beijing and its deepening strategic partnership with Washington.
None of the reports speculated on how these tensions might be navigated within a C5, but the sheer fact that India is mentioned highlights its rising global relevance.
Also Watch:
With inputs from agencies
End of Article
