Russia is increasingly targeting European satellites, raising fears over weak encryption in older systems and the risk of spying, disruption, or sabotage as the war in Ukraine drags on
European security officials believe Russian “inspector” satellites, notably Luch-1 and Luch-2, have been shadowing and intercepting communications from at least a dozen key European geostationary satellites.
These satellites provide critical connectivity services across Europe, Africa and parts of the Middle East, making their compromise a strategic concern for both civilian and military infrastructure.
Tracking data and space agency observations, cited by the Financial Times indicate that the Luch series has made repeated, close approaches to European satellites, remaining in proximity for extended periods—sometimes weeks—since its launch in 2023.
Officials suspect these maneuvers are part of signals intelligence operations (SIGINT) aimed at intercepting unencrypted command data transmitted between ground stations and the satellites.
European intelligence sources have called the activity a part of a broader pattern of “hybrid warfare,” noting that such interceptions could expose confidential government and military information and potentially serve as the basis for future interference or operational disruption.
Although the suspected satellites may not yet have destructive capabilities, the data they collect could help Russia assess how to manipulate or degrade satellite operations in future conflicts.
There are growing concerns that many older European satellites lack modern encryption, making them vulnerable to spying. Experts warn that stolen control data could later be used to disrupt operations, alter orbits, or even disable satellites.
How undersea cables became the soft underbelly of Europe’s digital economy
Beyond satellites, Russia has also been accused of targeting undersea fiber-optic cables, which carry roughly 99% of global data traffic and support more than $10 trillion in daily financial transactions. These cables have become a key focus of Moscow’s evolving hybrid warfare strategy.
Throughout 2024 and 2025, a series of suspicious incidents in the Baltic and North Seas—often involving so-called “shadow fleet” tankers or research vessels such as the Yantar—have highlighted the extreme vulnerability of this infrastructure.
These operations are believed to rely on “grey zone” tactics, including dragging heavy anchors to sever cables, enabling Russia to disrupt Western communications while maintaining plausible deniability and avoiding a direct military response from Nato.
The incidents have added urgency to discussions among European space and defence officials about boosting space security, encryption, and sovereign satellite capabilities.
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